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Background in music philosophy. Questions about musical meaning are usually discussed 
within the area of philosophy of music. These questions gained particular urgencyin the 
Modern Age, when music had lost its connection with the old cosmologies that assured its 
position among the other disciplines related to harmony and numbers. In the last centuries 
philosophers and composers have tried to explain music as art and one of the most prominent 
attempts was the formalist perspective advocated by Hanslick. From that perspective music is 
considered on its own without any required connection with something non-musical, and its 
meaning or its content consists of the very unfolding of musical structures over time that are 
intelligible to the intellect through some form of reasoning. 
Background in music psychology. We consider two psychological theories of musical 
meaning that have been developed by two authors: Leonard Meyer and David Huron. Meyer 
created a theory of musical meaning based on the Gestalt principles and the practice of music 
analysis; Huron has constructed a theory based on experimental psychology and statistical 
analysis of music. On the one hand, both theories are complementary, especially regarding the 
role hypotheses have in the process of music signification; on the other hand, both lack an 
explanation of how hypotheses are generated. 
Aims. This paper aims at connecting the contributions of C.S. Peirce’s philosophy to the 
studies and investigations of musical meaning. Firstly, we consider his pragmatic concept of 
meaning; secondly, we analyze the role abductive reasoning has in his logic of discovery, 
outlining how the generation and evaluation of hypotheses can help to explain an encountered 
phenomenon. Thirdly, we apply the insights derived from this to an analysis of musical 
meaning, by indicating how a meaningful interpretation of a musical piece can be provided 
through the generation of hypotheses about its underlying structure. 
Main contribution. If the assumption is correct that hypotheses formulation is at the basis of 
music signification processes, we believe that Peircean philosophy, especially his semiotics, 
can help to elucidate how hypotheses are generated during music listening, furnishing an 
interesting and fruitful picture of musical meaning and complementing the psychological 
perspective on it with a logical and pragmatic point of view. 
Implications. C.S. Peirce’s thought is extremely interdisciplinary. The Peircean approach to 
musical meaning in collaboration with empirical studies of music psychology, can offer a more 
complete logical description of hypothesis generation (the basis of music signification). 
Moreover, the Peircean approach can strengthen the speculative practice of music philosophy, 
by providing a pragmatic and logical concept of meaning in music in close dialogue with 
scientific approaches. 
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This paper relates the concept of musical meaning to the notion of abductive 
reasoning as described in the pragmatism of C.S. Peirce.i We argue that the logical 
notion of abduction or abductive reasoning could help to complement theories that 
take exclusively psychological elements into account. Abductive reasoning has been 
considered one of the most important contributions of Peirce’s philosophy to the study 
of creativity and discovery, in science, art and other domains (see Queiroz & Merrell, 
2005 for a comprehensive account of abduction in different domains). According to 
Peirce’s account of creativity, the interaction between three kinds of reasoning 
(abduction, deduction and induction) is responsible for the typical action of the mind: 
to free the organism from doubt and act in proper ways. The process of liberating the 
mind from doubts begins with the generation of hypotheses. As will be explained in 
the third and fourth part of the present article, the main function of abductive 
reasoning is to generate hypotheses that may clarify or explain an anomalous situation 
that prevents the mind from following its habitual path. 
In the first part, besides briefly discussing the traditional esthetic perspective of 
musical meaning, we present two more recent theories on this subject in the field of 
Psychology of Music. More specifically, we take Leonard Meyer’s and David 
Huron’s accounts of musical meaning into consideration. Although both theories 
leave room for hypothesis generation during listening to music meaningfully, they do 
not explain how this could be done biologically, psychologically or logically. We then 
consider the nature of abductive reasoning and its role in the guiding of the creative 
mind, from the perspective of C.S. Peirce’s pragmatic philosophy. We start with a 
general introduction to his philosophical ideas and then focus on his concept of 
abductive reasoning. Finally, we present some examples in order to illustrate how the 
concept of abduction could provide a logical complement to the earlier mentioned 
recent positions on musical meaning. 
Philosophical and esthetical background 
Musical meaning is implicitly or explicitly involved in almost any work about music 
and philosophy. In the ancient times of pre-Socratic Greek philosophy, music was 
considered from the perspective of a cosmology that was sustained by the concept of 
number. Music and geometry were considered as different manifestations of such 
arché, or ordering principles, and music involved not only organized sound but also 
poetry and dance. Plato did not significantly alter this cosmological perspective on 
music as held by Pythagoras, limiting himself at discussing its ethic and esthetic 
character and its role in the paideia, the greek education; for Plato music was 
considered more a (perhaps pleasurable) threat than a virtue to a healthy society. In 
addition, in the Platonic metaphysics, music and art were taken as second-order copies 
of the ideal realm, as copies of the already mimetic domain of the appearances. 
Aristotle was less concerned with the hedonistic dangers of music or with its position 
in a metaphysical system than he was with its formal congruence and structure, and 
claimed that any art has its intrinsic pleasure by virtue of its harmonious 
configurations. 
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In later centuries, the Platonic and Pythagorean ideas on music were translated and 
adapted to the emerging Christian doctrine. Roughly, one can suggest that the theory 
of music as imitation and based on the concept of number underwent no further 
fundamental developments until the modern age, in spite of the growing development 
of musical theory over the centuries. The Copernican revolution, inaugurating the 
Modern Age and a new cosmology, brought new challenges to the philosophy and 
esthetics of music (see Scruton, 1997). Music was no longer supported by its relation 
to the unified and harmonious universe so its validity and importance had to be 
attributed to other factors. The doctrine of mimesis was sustained, but more and more 
attributed to passions rather than to nature or ideal reality. During the 18th century 
musicians and philosophers shared a belief that music evokes passions in a sort of 
sonic discourse comprising small meaningful unities called figures that imitate certain 
affects (see Bartel, 1997), reminding us of Harnoncourt’s term of “eloquent music” 
(Harnoncourt & Collins, 1984). However, Bowman (1998) claims that the romantic 
esthetics of music, especially in Germany, sought to locate music’s significance 
within the spirit, as ideas in the mind. The problem turned out to be how something 
apparently non-conceptual as music could communicate anything at all. Usually, 
philosophers were more concerned with situating music into an esthetic system that 
was coherent with the general epistemological system they were creating than to 
attend specifically to the very appeal of music perception, still supporting the implicit 
idea that music somehow imitates emotions and affects in a sort of obscure language. 
Philosophically, music was completely analyzed in virtue of its adequacy in relation 
to the esthetic principles of modern metaphysics, as in Kant or Hegel for instance, 
rather than to its own perceptible structures and forms. Generally, in modern 
philosophy, apart from some theoretical idiosyncrasies, music was always understood 
as a kind of emotional mimetic artifact, as Schueller (1953: 345) describes: 
Kant called music a language of the emotions and Hegel called it a language of 
sentiment. The statements in ancient literature and history which make similar 
assertions have been repeated so often that they hardly need retelling. The history of 
western thought also is full of statements linking music with the emotions, merely 
human ones during the eighteenth century, and even mystical, transcendental, or 
metaphysical ones during the Romantic Movement. In the eighteenth century, Rousseau 
in France, Marpurg and Mattheson in Germany, Burney in England, several empirical 
philosophers in Scotland, all agreed that music is a moving art. And, in nineteenth 
century, Kierkegaard, Schumann, and Wagner thought of it as a language of feelings. 
Schopenhauer, Pater, and, in this century, writers like Conrad and philosophers like 
Croce in their different ways spoke of it as a kind of illumination through emotion. 
In the 19th century, when musicology was becoming a structured area of its own, 
Edward Hanslick undertook, against this background rather daringly, the task of 
defining and explaining musical beauty in terms of music itself. He also attempted to 
formulate a new point of view to all other issues of musical esthetics. His negative 
thesis was that music is not the imitation of emotions or passions; his positive thesis 
was that music’s content is its very form, its very notes shaped by the intellect 
(Hanslick, 1901). Music has to be understood in terms of its unfolding structures of 
musical ideas. Musical scholarship has to mirror the practices of the natural sciences 
and seek for what necessarily takes part in its description and to break the appeal of 
common-sensical, yet unreasonable opinions. Any extra-musical connotation should 
L.F. Oliveira, W.F.G. Haselager, J. Manzolli and M.E.Q Gonzalez 
 
48 
not be considered part of the meaning of music, musical structure alone is sufficient 
for musical understanding, and relations of musical structures to emotional contents or 
reactions are at least misleading, if not “pathological” in esthetical discussions. One 
might say that Hanslick threw out the baby with the bath water, but it was important 
in that time to undertake such a formalist approach for bringing music itself more into 
the focus of esthetic discussion. Despite Hanslick’s attempt to formulate a 
philosophical analysis based on formal elements, he did grant that musical meaning is 
grounded in perception, so musical meaning can be thought of in terms of the 
dynamical process of listening to music’s phenomenal developments, in relation to 
expectations and frustrations. In Hanslick’s words (1901: 135): 
The most important factor in the mental process which accompanies the act of listening 
to music, and which converts it to a source of pleasure, is frequently overlooked. We 
here refer to the intellectual satisfaction which the listener derives from continually 
following and anticipating the composer’s intentions—now, to see his expectations 
fulfilled, and now, to find himself agreeably mistaken. It is a matter of course that this 
intellectual flux and reflux, this perpetual giving and receiving takes place 
unconsciously, and with the rapidity of lightning-flashes. 
However, as Meyer (1956: 4) mentioned, Hanslick’s account lacks in explaining “the 
manner in which an abstract, non-referential succession of tones becomes 
meaningful.” 
The psychology of musical meaning 
Leonard Meyer claimed in the very beginning of his 1956 book that the history of 
esthetics could be split into the referentialist and the absolutist theories. The former 
group would include perspectives such as the mimetic or discursive theories of 
musical meaning, theories that ground an understanding of music on the basis of 
extra-musical phenomena such as emotions or affects. The latter group relates to the 
formalist account as advocated by Hanslick and sympathizers, that consider musical 
content as musical form only. Meyer tried to synthesize both absolutists and 
referentialists perspectives into a single frame, considering meaning and emotion as 
different consequences of the same process of structural listening. The basis for his 
(esthetic) theory was to be found in the psychology of listening rather than in 
philosophical discourse. 
The main assumptions of Meyer’s account of structural listening are the mental 
principles offered by Gestalt Psychology (e.g. Koffka, 1935). The Gestalt principles 
are general enough to be related to any mental process that involves perception and 
cognition of formal qualities and could help to explain how individual tones are 
grouped together thereby forming higher-level units. The basic Gestalt principle is the 
law of prägnanz, a word best translated by conciseness, which can be described as the 
tendency of a (mental) system to always seek for the most concise, steady, regular, 
ordered, economic, simple form or process possible (Kubovy, 2001). The law of 
prägnanz can be decomposed in more specific principles, e.g., good continuation, 
closure, similarity, symmetry, proximity, and figure-ground relations. Based on such 
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principles Meyer derived his model of significance and affect in music listening. 
More specifically, the affective and/or meaningful response to music derives from the 
perception (and cognitive processing) of the formal qualities of music structures and 
the expectancies they generate. The Meyerian viewpoint (or better hearpoint), thus, 
does not theorize about music communication on the basis of it conveying extra-
musical concepts or mimicking (or mimetizing) affects and passions, but on the basis 
of expectancies derived from perceived formal qualities. It seems that Gestalt 
Psychology offered the principles that were missing in Hanslick’s visualization of the 
listening process.ii 
Meyer’s model of musical meaning is composed of three distinct instances (or 
processes): hypothetical meaning, evident meaning, and determinate meaning. 
Hypothetical meaning is the unconscious generation of expectations related to and 
specific of a stimulus situation, that could be described by probabilistic relationships 
between antecedents and consequents. Evident meaning occurs when the consequent 
becomes “actualized as a concrete musical event,” reaching a “new stage of meaning” 
(Meyer, 1956: 37). The evident meaning appears when that relation between 
antecedent and consequent is actually perceived. There can be a conflicting tension 
between the two meanings, especially when the expected consequent is delayed or 
deceptive.  
This dynamical process of signification could be visualized in a “causality chain,” 
since each evident meaning turns into a hypothetical one in the unfolding of musical 
events, like  
S
1








.. .. . . ,  
where Sn means a specific stimulus and Cn a specific consequent Meyer (1956: 37). 
The fact that an actual consequent could or could not confirm the hypothetical 
meaning does not modify the nature and operation of the process.iii The dynamic of 
hypothetical and evident meanings can be illustrated in Figure 1. 
Determinate meanings, Meyer (1956: 38) said, “arise out of the relationships existing 
between hypothetical meaning, evident meaning, and the latter stages of the musical 
development.” This kind of meaning has the distinctive characteristic of being 
manifest in the “timeless work” of memory, when the relations among stimuli are 
comprehended in their totality.iv Determinate meaning happens when musical 
meaning becomes objectified, through a process that operates over an object of a 
listener’s consciousness. In Meyer’s perspective, as objects of consciousness they 
originate from anomalies detected in stimuli or when habitual responses are not 
suitable for dealing with specific sonic structures. Meyer (1956: 39) said that “if 
meaning is to be objectified at all, it will as a rule become so when difficulties are 
encountered that make normal, automatic behavior impossible.” 
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Figure 1. The dynamic of hypothetical and evident meanings that might occur during the 
listening of J.S. Bach’s Fugue in C minor from Das Wohltemperierte Klavier I, measures 9-11. 
The phrase under the x brace is the unexpected consequent, in relation to the antecedents in a 
sequential structure. (Example from Meyer, 1956: 48) 
The same process, i.e., the inefficiency of habitual action, enforces both the 
determinate meaning and the affective reaction to the music. In this sense, the author 
justifies his position claiming that emotions and reflexive thought are not two distinct 
things, but different manifestations of the same psychological process: “both depend 
upon the same perceptive process, the same stylistic habits, the same models of 
mental organization; and the same musical processes give rise to and shape both types 
of experience” (Meyer, 1956: 39-40). It seems that an emphasis on one aspect or the 
other in musical experience is due to dispositions and beliefs regarding esthetic 
experience or formal musical training. When habitual operation works undisturbed, 
music listening and signification occurs in a quite unconscious manner, “following 
and anticipating the composer’s [supposed] intentions” (Hanslick, 1901: 135). 
In other words, meaning and affect derive from the tension between predictability and 
surprise created by musical structures during listening. Meyer describes the 
relationship between surprise and predictable structures in terms of norms and 
deviations within a music style, which could only be a matter of dispositions and 
habits embodied in musicians and listeners. Aiken (1947: 156) said that  
 (…) we speak of “traditions,” “styles of art,” “meanings,” and so on, as if these things had a kind 
of independent reality of their own which are eternally attached to works of art. But traditions and 
meanings are kept alive only through the dispositions and habits which form the subjective 
contexts of countless individuals. Works of aesthetic art, we must continually remind ourselves, 
exist only as objects of perception and feeling. There can be no aesthetic content whatever apart 
from the responses of individual men which give it meaning.  
Thus, in Meyer’s account there are two kinds of mental processes in operation when 
music becomes meaningful and affective: the applications of Gestalt laws and of 
habits and beliefs.v Gestalt laws make us perceive the formal qualities of sound 
stimuli,vi and (learned and culturally dependent) habits of listening and esthetic beliefs 
(see Aiken, 1951) make us perceive what musical structures are normative and what 
are deviant within a musical style. Both processes give rise to expectations that form 
the basis of a meaningful and emotional relationship with music. These expectations 
(related to the perception of norms and deviations) are culturally embedded, which 
means that they exist as habits and dispositions embodied in each and every 
individual of a community. Meyer’s theory was important because he furnished a 
fruitful hypothesis of how listening works and gives musical form to otherwise 
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unrelated sound stimuli, permitting meaning and emotion to be accounted for in 
esthetic musical experience. 
The perspective Leonard Meyer initiated was debated mainly through theoretical 
discourse and evidence collected in the practice of musical analysis. Conversely, 
David Huron (2006) has developed a theory of musical expectation based on the 
practice of experimental psychology and statistical analysis. Despite their very 
different approaches, both theories share similarities and could be taken as 
complementary. Huron offers a more updated account of musical expectation 
combined with detailed neuroanatomic underpinning of psychological theories, and an 
overall more biological perspective on musically induced emotions. Biologically 
speaking, “accurate expectations are adaptive mental functions that allow organisms 
to prepare for appropriate action and perception” (Huron, 2006). Anticipations or 
expectations are present in all spheres of experience, and it seems that the 
development of the human neocortex is related to the generation of expectations 
(Barlow, 2001). 
Emotions are often taken as a counterpart of expectations, acting as motivators or 
enhancersvii of the objectives and purposes of organisms (Frijda, 1987, 1986; Scherer 
& Ekman, 1984). Huron (2006: 4) synthesizes such views saying that “emotions 
encourage organisms to pursue behaviors that are normally adaptive and to avoid 
behaviors that are normally maladaptive.” The relation between anticipation and 
emotional state is at the kernel of Huron’s theory. Briefly, when expectations fail in 
predicting a future outcome, and consequently the situation could be potentially 
dangerous to the organism, its emotional state is characterized by a negatively 
valenced feeling, that, through associative mechanisms, becomes linked to the 
specific situation. In the opposite way, when the prediction is correct, there is a 
positive emotion that acts as a reward for the organism’s predictive success.  
Anatomically, two different neural pathways have been suggested that operate 
concomitantly and are correlated with the feelings of surprise, as rendered in Figure 2. 
The fast, limbic, track results, in the case of dangerous stimuli, in negative emotional 
states, and prepares the organism for quick action while being in an unpredicted 
situation—being surprised means previously having predicted wrongly. The slow 
track involves cortical areas responsible for providing a contextualized but time-
consuming appraisal. The slow appraisal can reach a valence in contrast to the 
outcome of the fast track, for instance when the situation analysis reveals that the 
event besides surprising was not dangerous to the organism. The contrast between the 
negative and the potentially positive appraisal reinforces the final positive state. Thus, 
for Huron (2006), positive emotions can come from two possibilities: (i) when the 
anticipation is correct (limbic reward); and (ii) when the anticipation is not correct but 
is also not dangerous (contrastive valence).viii 
It should be noted that prediction in Huron’s account is mainly a matter of probability, 
and as such the main mental process involved in generating prediction is induction. 
Induction is a way to economically deal with future events as if they are similar to 
those encountered in previous situations; if a strategy ran fine a few times it might 
also run fine again. This way, past experiences can be understood as steering behavior 
or to drive expectancies about the future. Relating this to music, the listening 
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experience of a person  provides the basis for his or her musical expectations while 
listening, and these expectations, Huron claims, could be adequately described by a 
statistical analysis of the repertoire listened to.  
 
 
Figure 2. Schematic diagram of the neural pathways involved in emotional reactions of 
surprising events. The fast track is responsible for the negative valence right after the 
perception of a surprising event. The slow track involves appraisal and could be positively, 
negatively or neutrally valenced. In most cases, the contrastive interaction of both systems is 
associated with feelings of surprise. (Figure from Huron, 2006: 20) 
 
Huron (2006) has proposed four types of expectations: veridical, schematic, dynamic 
and conscious. Each expectation in his model is related to a specific kind of memory.ix 
Veridical expectations are associated to specific listening situations of determined 
musical works, it is represented in episodic memory, which codes a sort of 
autobiography. Schematic expectations reflect general cultural patterns of music 
structures and forms; it is coded into semantic memory and gets learned by exposure 
to a certain cultural environment. Dynamic expectations involve information coded in 
short-term memory and are driven by the unfolding of musical structures, as the 
interaction of antecedents and consequents described by Meyer. Lastly, conscious 
expectations are verbal and explicit about what could happen next, running in a sort of 
“working memory,” and its operation is similar to what Meyer called objectification 
of meaning. The three kinds of pre-verbal, unconscious expectations are responsible 
for the most situations during ordinary listening, when there is no necessity of 
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deliberative reasoning and expectations are inductively applied. Table 1 summarizes 
musical expectations and memories in Huron’s theory. 
 
Table 1. Types of memories and musical expectations in Huron’s theory. 
Memory Expectation Description 
Episodic Veridical Reflect specific works and situations 
Semantic Schematic Reflect general cultural patterns, resulting from a 
lifespan of listening 
Short-term Dynamic Reflect real-time adaptive responses while 
listening 
Working Conscious Reflect conscious thought and explicitly 
knowledge 
Leaving aside their many differences, both Meyer and Huron estimate the role 
surprise has in musical listening, resulting in affective responses by means of 
breaking the expectations, culminating in the objectification of meaning for the first 
and contrastive valence for the second, and in this sense both perspectives seem 
complementary rather than contradictory. However, when a listener’s inductive and 
statistically learned schemas prove themselves wrong or inappropriate, a new schema 
should be generated. Meyer did not considered how beliefs and habits, the basis of his 
esthetical consideration, are generated; Huron explains that mental schemas are 
statistically extracted from a repertoire, i.e., they reflect general structures recurrent in 
a musical culture and points out that inductive failure plays an important role in the 
generation of new schemas. This perspective has a very abductive flavour and the 
current paper can be considered as a more detailed proposal on how it can be worked 
out from a Peircean viewpoint. Specifically, we will focus on the role of failed 
expectations in the qualitative generation of new hypotheses, and how one could 
conceive the background against which the notion of ‘failed expectations’ can be 
understood. Thus, we are concerned with the meaningfulness of the generated 
hypotheses. In the final sections of this paper, we will sketch the outlines of an 
analysis of this problem based upon Charles S. Peirce’s pragmatist perspective. 
Meaning in the pragmatism of C.S. Peirce 
The amount of writing of C.S. Peirce is so impressive that even nowadays, almost one 
century after his death, a great part of his work remains unpublished, accessible only 
through the manuscripts at Indiana University.x Undoubtedly, a great part of the 
academic efforts directed at drawing the implications of Peirce concentrate on his 
semiotics, which form part of his logical system. As it is going to be further 
explained, Peirce’s semiotics differs in many ways from traditional formal logics, in 
special because it allows the study of qualitative aspects of logical relations Thanks to 
this unique characteristics, many scholars have focused on the understanding of 
musical signs based on the Peircean semiotic triad expressed by the dynamic 
relationship between object-sign-interpretant. The central idea is that signs, different 
from symbols (that constitute only a particular case of degenerated signs), have 
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quality properties. In this sense, signs constitute the main vehicle of meaning, which 
results from the action of a triadic process Peirce denominated Semiosis (CP 3.484): 
(…) by "semiosis" I mean (…) an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a 
cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-
relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs. 
{Sémeiösis} in Greek of the Roman period, as early as Cicero's time, if I remember 
rightly, meant the action of almost any kind of sign; and my definition confers on 
anything that so acts the title of a "sign." 
Semiosis is, then, a process of interaction between components of a triad involving a 
sign–that specifies an object to an interpretant–, an object that determines the sign, 
which in turn determines the interpretant. The fundamental notion to be understood 
here is that of sign. According to Peirce: 
A Sign is everything which is related to a Second thing, its Object, in respect to a 
Quality, in such a way as to bring  a Third thing, its Interpretant, into relation to the 
same Object, and that in such way as to bring a Fourth into relation to that Object in the 
same form, ad infinitum. (CP 2.92) 
In this sense, Semiosis is sometimes described as a qualitative emergent or process of 
a semiotic system, which can deal with different kinds of signs. (Queiroz & El-Hani, 
2006). In a diagram, El-Hani et al. (2006: 14), following Peirce, display the 
interactions between the three components of Semiosis, as illustrated in Figure 3: 
 
 
Figure 3. A Diagram expressing the dynamic interaction between the three terms of Semiosis 
(Diagram from El-Hani et al. 2006: 14). 
 
The logical study of the necessary conditions for Semiosis is the subject matter of 
Semiotics, which constitutes the basis of all other aspects of the Peircean 
philosophical system; all of them grounded in the presupposition of three fundamental 
categories: firstness, secondness and thirdness. In a very summarized way these 
categories can be described respectively as: Firstness, the one which encompasses the 
domain of absolute freedom, pure feeling without form or constraints, allowing 
genuine novelty to come into existence. Secondness encompasses all forms of 
contrasts originated by duality and the presence of diversity, potentially leading to 
adjustments of earlier existing habits. Thirdness comprises continuity, generality, and 
all forms of laws. Although these three categories are intrinsically correlated, it is the 
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first one that allows genuine creation whenever a shock, produced by the experience 
of an anomaly, occurs in the domain of Secondness. 
Hopefully this very summarized description of Peirce`s categories allows the 
appreciation of the following passage by Ibri (2009) describing in  a  more poetic  
way qualitative aspects of abductive reasoning:   
 
Peirce, at times, allows himself an explicit moment of poetry when he says that in the 
abductive moment the researcher must “sit down and listen to the voice of nature until 
you catch the tune . . . The invention of the right hypothesis requires genius—an inward 
garden of ideas that will furnish the true pollen for the flowers of observation.” (CP. ) 
This apprehension of the tonality also enables him to say that “man’s mind must have 
been attuned to the truth of things in order to discover what he has discovered. It is the 
very bedrock of logical truth.” Evidently, for a logician with a classical education, these 
statements must sound out of character. But Peirce, according to our basic hypothesis in 
this essay, starts from that original aesthetic unity and introduces the logical value of 
the qualities of feeling, giving it an ontological meaning under the category of 
Firstness. It comes from his appreciation of the freedom of the mind as heuristically 
fundamental for the discovery of theories.  
 
Despite Peirce’s emphasis on the interrelatedness of his thoughts, given the richness 
of Semiotics, we are going to limit ourselves to the analysis of just some aspects of 
his overall system focusing specifically on the pragmatic approach to the Logic of 
Discovery. Pragmatist philosophy, especially the Peircean pragmatism, has a 
fundamental commitment to a specific concept of truth, intrinsically connected to the 
experimental method of inquiry. For Peirce, truth is a property of beliefs, although 
never a definitive one, and always submitted to practical, i.e., experimental, 
investigations. Investigation is motivated by doubt resulting from a conflict between 
well established beliefs and facts; both of them play an important role in the inquiring 
mind. As Peirce stresses: 
Thus, both doubt and belief have positive effects upon us, though very different ones. 
Belief does not make us act at once, but puts us into such a condition that we shall 
behave in some certain way, when the occasion arises. Doubt has not the least such 
active effect, but stimulates us to inquiry until it is destroyed. (CP 5.373)  
To liberate the mind of a state of doubt is the main aim of investigation that may lead, 
when successful, to a new and always provisory (thus fallible) belief. A belief is a 
stable habit; doubt is absence of habit.xi The truth is linked, thus, with the habits of 
mind to deal and act in accordance with facts; when there are incongruous 
correspondences between beliefs and facts, there is doubt. True beliefs are anchored 
to practical effects, as the pragmatic maxim states: 
Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you conceive the 
objects of your conception to have. Then, your conception of those effects is the whole 
of your conception of the object. (CP 5.438, author’s emphasis)  
In this sense, meaning is also attached to practical issues: 
In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one should consider what 
practical consequences might conceivably result by necessity from the truth of that 
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conception; and the sum of these consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the 
conception. (CP 5.9)  
In another paragraph, the author emphasizes this point: 
(…) the whole function of thought is to produce habits of action; and that whatever 
there is connected with a thought, but irrelevant to its purpose, is an accretion to it, but 
no part of it. If there be a unity among our sensations which has no reference to how we 
shall act on a given occasion, as when we listen to a piece of music, why we do not call 
that thinking. To develop its meaning, we have, therefore, simply to determine what 
habits it produces, for what a thing means is simply what habits it involves. Now, the 
identity of a habit depends on how it might lead us to act, not merely under such 
circumstances as are likely to arise, but under such as might possibly occur, no matter 
how improbable they may be. What the habit is depends on when and how it causes us 
to act. As for the when, every stimulus to action is derived from perception; as for the 
how, every purpose of action is to produce some sensible result. Thus, we come down 
to what is tangible and conceivably practical, as the root of every real distinction of 
thought, no matter how subtle it may be; and there is no distinction of meaning so fine 
as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice. (CP 5.400)  
Thus, according to Peirce, meaning is pragmatically connected to habit formation, it is 
a necessary condition for the occurrence of action. Meaning is also at the heart of 
inquiry and of the process of hypothesis generation known as abduction. 
Abductive reasoning and the logic of discovery 
Peirce’s logic of discovery is developed in the context of his semiotic study of 
creativity. Peirce believed that in order to understand how a mind creates new habits 
one should first dive in the domain of Logic, for any semiotic system is foremost a 
logical system. But one has to consider that the term logic has a rather broad sense 
within the Peircean philosophical system. The process of gaining knowledge about the 
world, of investigating facts and overcoming doubts begins with the creation of 
hypotheses, which, ultimately, is the primordial manifestation of what Peirce 
considered to be a logical-semiotic process: reasoning. 
From the Peircean perspective, the process of hypothesis creation begins with doubt. 
Doubt indicates a conflict between expectations and facts; given that expectations are 
not always successful, sometimes there is a conflict between the expectations of well-
established habits and the dynamics of environmental events, producing a surprising 
effect. From Peirce’s semiotic perspective, there are two kinds of surprise: active and 
passive.xii Active surprises occur “when what one perceives positively conflicts with 
expectations”; passive surprises occur “when having no positive expectation but only 
the absence of any suspicion of anything out of the common, something quite 
unexpected occurs,  such as a total eclipse of the sun which one had not anticipated” 
(CP 8.315).xiii The distinction between active and passive surprises captures the 
difference between situations where an explicit expectation is thwarted (i.e. the 
anticipated event is not occurring), and situations where no explicit expectations are 
formed and something out of the ordinary takes place. 
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According to the logic of pragmatism, surprising situations require the reformulation 
of beliefs and the formation of new habits. Given the nature of beliefs, understood as 
coherent and stable assimilated habits, the mind seeks to overcome conflicting 
situations by creating new habits, which in turn may generate beliefs if they are more 
consistent than the previous ones. As stressed by Gonzalez & Haselager (2005), 
according to the Peircean view, conflict and doubt will persist until the mind forms a 
new set of beliefs, transforming the surprising situation into a “matter of course.” In 
this process, several hypotheses are created as candidates of a new system of beliefs 
that will adjust the originally anomalous experience. 
In addition to his inspiring arguments in defense of a logic of discovery, Peirce (CP 
5.189) offers a description of the process of creative reasoning, which he called 
abductive reasoning: 
 
A surprising fact, C, is observed. 
But if H were true, C would be a matter of course. 
Hence, there is reason to suspect that H is true.  
 
It is important to keep in mind that abduction is fallible—it does not provide 
certainties, as happens with deductive reasoning—, its main function is to help with 
the construction of new counterfactuals whenever old habits stop carrying out their 
task of rendering the world meaningful. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Peirce, 
abduction is very useful in guiding the mind when confronted with surprising events 
and anomalous facts, helping to free the mind from doubts. It is worthwhile to briefly 
consider a terminological issue. Induction proper refers to the generalization from a 
set of examples (sometimes called ‘enumerative induction’, e.g. Harman, 1992; see 
also Haselager, 1997). This is to be distinguished from the process of abduction that 
also could be labeled as a hypothesis generating kind of induction (dubbed 
‘hypothetical induction’ by Harman). Our use of the term ‘abduction’ is not to make a 
terminological point, but serves to emphasize the importance of the overall Peircean 
perspective to the topic of musical meaning. 
Peirce emphasized the effortlessness, almost perceptual nature of the abductive 
process. As he said:  
Abductive inference shades into perceptual judgment without any sharp line of 
demarcation between them (…) The abductive suggestion comes to us like a flash. 
(CP.5.181; see also Haselager, 2007) 
In another passage he suggests that abduction is almost like an instinct: 
 This Faculty is at the same time of the general nature of Instinct, resembling the 
instincts of the animals in its so far surpassing the general powers of our reason and for 
its directing us as if we were in possession of facts that are entirely beyond the reach of 
our senses. It resembles instinct too in its small liability to error; for though it goes 
wrong oftener than right, yet the relative frequency with which it is right is on the 
whole the most wonderful thing in our constitution. (CP.5.173)  
Peirce considered that abduction’s “only justification is that from its suggestion 
deduction can draw a prediction which can be tested by induction, and that, if we are 
ever to learn anything or to understand phenomena at all, it must be by abduction that 
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this is to be brought about” (CP.5.171). Knowledge (be it scientific or artistic) is 
constructed by the integration of these three kinds of reasoning—deductive, inductive 
and abductive—, assuming the primary role that abduction plays in elaborating 
hypothesis and surpassing conflicting and uncertain situations. 
It seems that the existence of a lawlike quality of the principle of prägnanz of Gestalt 
psychology, which states that the mind will always seek for the most steady, simple or 
coherent pattern (instead of the unstable and complex ones), could be understood as 
an instantiation of habit within the Peircean perspective. In this sense, it is interesting 
to recall that Peirce claimed that abduction is also involved in perceptual judgments, 
which despite their natural and possibly unconscious character, are hypothetical rather 
than definitive, a matter of habit rather than of unchanging fact. 
Additionally, what is more interesting here, is that abductive reasoning can be  
considered as a valuable analytical  tool  for the expansion of knowledge, helping  
with the understanding of the logical process of formulation of new hypotheses. In 
regular and coherent situations the mind operates deductively and inductively upon 
stable habits. When anomalous situations occur, abduction comes into function by 
helping with the reconstruction of articulated frames (the generation of explanatory 
hypotheses) so that the mind can be free of doubts. 
On the basis of this brief summary of Peirce’s view on the nature of abductive 
reasoning, we suggest that it could be worth investigating the question concerning the 
possible existence of a general principle underlying the emotional meaningful 
response that accompanies musical listening. To conclude, we are going to present 
evidence in defense of the hypothesis that Peirce’s pragmatic view on abduction can 
bring some light in the understanding of the process of music signification. 
An abductive perspective on musical meaning 
Now we should recall the course we have assumed so far, in order to see how and 
why Pragmatism and the Logic of Discovery can contribute to studies on music 
signification. We have begun with Hanslick’s argument against the mimetic theories 
of musical meaning so popular in musical esthetics (and common-sense understanding 
of music) of his days, i.e., that musical content could only be instantiated as the forms 
musical structures have in the perceptive domain of listening. However, despite his 
partially correct view, Hanslick could not explain how chunks of musical structures 
generate forms and how they are turned into meaningful elements; he was concerned 
more to show that music could not convey extra-musical meanings than in explaining 
how music could be intelligible exclusively on its own terms. Approximately hundred 
years later, Leonard Meyer tried to theorize about what the Hanslickian formalism 
lacked: he furnished a theory of musical expectation as the basis for musical affective 
and meaningful responses, without considering the possibility of extra-musical 
connotations.xiv As we have seen, he distinguished three kinds of meaning: 
hypothetical, evident and determinate. Most important in Meyer’s theory is the 
concept of hypothetical meaning, the basis of musical expectations, and consequently, 
of any significant (and affective) experience of music. 
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There seems to be a correlation between emotional states and the efficiency of 
generated expectations in listening. Meyer pointed to that psychological correlation, 
but his theory did not establish effectively how it would be originated, besides 
indicating that the frustration of expectations seemed to be at the basis of emotional 
reactions of music. It was Huron who fifty years later discussed the 
neurophysiological perspective on the relation between expectations and emotions. 
Huron ascribed the affective experience of listening to the phenomena of contrastive 
valence and limbic reward in response to the organism predictive efficiency. And in 
support of his theory of musical expectation, David Huron has provided us with a 
considerable amount of experimental data regarding musical expectations and 
affective responses.  
However, neither philosophy nor psychology (nor neuroscience) have so far provided 
the conceptual means to investigate the generation of hypotheses that lead to 
expectations (meaningful experience) that, in turn, can result in affect during listening 
(emotional experience). Logically, Huron’s theory is constructed on the basis of the 
traditional deductive-inductive inferential form, explaining through it how musical 
listening operates in anticipating the upcoming events. Induction is the logical 
inference which permits a hypothesis to be verified against the facts. But, how and 
why is such a hypothesis created in the first place? Differently, Meyer’s account of 
musical meaning is not logically, but psychologically elaborated, and also fails at 
explaining how hypotheses are generated in perception. Meyer assumes that 
expectations somehow reflect what Aiken (1951) called esthetical beliefs and 
dispositions; Huron assumes that expectations reflect general schemas apprehended 
by exposure to a cultural environment—in this sense, both authors presuppose an 
inductive perspective: the application and verification of a previous schema. 
It seems to us that precisely at this point that Peirce’s Logic of Discovery could be of 
relevance. It is plausible to suggest a relation between the psychological formulations 
from Meyer, the experimental and biological evidence from Huron, and the logical 
perspective of Peirce’s pragmatism, offering a more comprehensive picture of how 
musical expectations are constructed during listening and result in emotion. In short, 
our thesis here is that at the basis of the process of signification in music is a very 
specific sort of logical reasoning which is responsible for the formulation of 
hypotheses in any domain of experience: abductive reasoning. Regarding Meyer’s 
belief that musical meaning begins with a hypothesis (hypothetical meaning), 
abduction is the logical inference which permits such hypothesis to be created. In 
relation to Huron’s statement that musical emotion (and meaning) is a matter of 
inductive application and verification of a previously existent schema, abduction is 
the kind of reasoning that creates schemas, especially when the existent ones prove 
themselves wrong in relation to facts (perceived events ). 




Figure 4. Beethoven’s ‘Waldstein’ Sonata Op.53, beginning of first movement. 
Pragmatically speaking, musical meaning, or better, musical signification, is a 
particular form of a general process of signification instantiated primarily and initially 
by means of abduction. At the same time it bears emphasis, as stated by Peirce, that 
the interaction between abduction, induction and deduction is always involved in any 
process of acquisition of knowledge by any semiotic system. In music signification, as 
well, there is the interaction of the three kinds of reasoning. 
On the bases of the inductive argumentxv there is a probabilistic perspective of 
understanding that would result merely from the exposures of a subject to works of a 
specific repertoire. But it seems that induction (and deduction) alone could not fully 
constitute the act of musical listening because the work itself does not tell us how we 
listen to it – it does not contain within itself the habits of listening that we use to 
understand it – even after several exposures. It is the Peircean analysis of habits, 
surprise and new hypothesis generation (by means of abduction) that provides the 
tools for analyzing this meaning-related aspect of musical listening. The beginning of 
a piece of contemporary music is a good example of how emphatically the esthetical 
beliefs and the listening habits one has might so often be wrong. The suggestion that 
only exposure to an artistic environment is responsible to the generation of habits or 
schemas also leads to a too passive view of such processes. Changing habits, in a 
pragmatic perspective is a matter of dispositions to investigate and to reformulate 
beliefs whenever it is productive (i.e. leading to more adequate habits). Even with 
very basic cognitive operations like grouping and segmenting the notes of a simple 
melody there is not a unique (and always true) rule that could be employed 
aprioristically or apprehended by repetitive listening. Assuming otherwise would 
imply that the work was revealing its secrets after several listening sections, even 
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when listened to with the same wrong habits over and over again.xvi  If nothing 
changes, nothing starts making sense. Perceiving units, phrases, formal structures in a 
broader sense are matters of hypothetical reasoning, from which one can deductively 
extract information that in turn are inductively verified against the sonic events, which 
constitute what we call a piece of music. We can take a Beethoven’s Sonata as an 
example for the integration of three types of reasoning during listening (see Figure 4). 
Every listener familiarized with the classical style would hear the first chord of a 
piano sonata as the tonic chord. The feeling of the tonic in this case will not last long 
as the introduction of the D major chord signalizes a new harmonic direction, at the 
end of the second measure. The listener rapidly recognizes a cadence structure in the 
form of IV – V – I (in G major). Cadence structures are normally understood 
deductively, they point unequivocally, as a matter of necessity, to a specific harmonic 
direction (assuming a tonal syntactic context). In accordance with the fact derived 
deductively, the mind generates expectations that are inductively verified in what 
follows. And even on these few chords, the primordial hypothesis that the first chord 
was the tonic has to be reformulated, in order to (retro-)understand it as the 
subdominant. But the music goes on and the composer breaks out such expectations 
introducing a strange chord for the context of G major. The listening mind has to seek 
again for what it would be, and quickly the cadence pattern arises again (IV – V – I), 
but now in another key. At this point there are two recognizable structures leading to 
different and contradictory tonalities. Besides the information deductively gathered, 
the frustrated expectations inductively generated, the mind must formulate a 
hypothesis in order to continue listening to this music actively and understandingly. In 
what follows, a new chord appears, an outsider from both keys over which cadences 
were made previously. And the new structure suddenly becomes another cadence (iv 
– V – i), now leading to a minor key that sounds not conclusive at all. In resume, we 
have three phrases that lead, deductively and inductively, to contradictory 
consequences–nothing is for sure in Beethoven–during the very first measures of this 
piece. The way to understand it, in the perspective of the Peircean Logic of Discovery 
is to formulate hypotheses that explain the anomalous facts, the contradictory 
structures perceived– something that  occurs while listening, in a glint, instinctively 
(CP 5.173). 
In an extremely homogeneous musical structure, induction and deduction will be 
manifest much more regularly than abduction, and in such case expectation would be 
a matter of probabilistic determination. In contrast, within a heterogeneous musical 
structure, abduction will manifest itself more often. Consider, for instance, 
composition by juxtaposition of different musical structures in early Stravinsky’s 
music, which is made without any transition or movement and with structures which 
themselves are not stereotyped or consensual (as the cadences in Beethoven’s 
example). We believe that in such a situation the listener has to create hypotheses 
relating the different thematic materials that the composer has made to follow each 
other. This kind of music require more of the abductive aspect of listening, especially 
because it is syntactically not so standardized as tonal music is; deduction would be 
less efficient in determining facts that would lead to expectations, verified 
inductively. 
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This kind of process which we have presented in relation to single works also occurs 
in broader contexts. The habits a listener has reflect the musical environment within 
which he or she is embedded. Inside dynamic musical environments musical habits 
have to be generated and adapted very frequently. A stable and invariant set of habits 
would not be suitable for a meaningful experience over different stylistic repertoires, 
for instance–new listening habits might be generated every time a new musical style 
or system emerges, or a significant variation starts occurring. The correlation between 
norms and deviants of musical systems and stylesxvii are also dynamically altered and, 
correlatively, the habits of listening must also be altered in the listener’s conceptual 
space (Boden, 1994). 
A conceptual space is a multidimensional structure that contains the principles that 
constitute and unify any area of knowledge. For instance, the tonal system is a 
generative system that could be considered as a conceptual space. Explorations made 
by composers not only investigate the possibilities of such a system, but occasionally 
also lead to transformations and expansion of its structure. The atonal transfiguration 
of the tonal system is one example of the transformation of a conceptual space within 
the music domain (Boden, 1994: 81). Gonzalez & Haselager (2005) have proposed 
that abduction could be considered as the logical inference that makes the expansion 
and transformation of conceptual spaces possible. 
Conceptual spaces are not only suitable to the description of the action of a composer, 
but to the habitual action of the listener as well. The set of habits that according to 
Peirce constitutes the beliefs of a person can be understood as providing a conceptual 
space. In this sense, listening habits and esthetics beliefs are elements of a music-
conceptual space. In the perspective of listeners, their conceptual spaces are altered 
every time a new habit or belief is created in response to a new sort of music. From 
the point of view we hold here, listening is a potentially creative action. The alteration 
of the listener’s conceptual space encompasses new beliefs, new habits,xviii which will 
generate new possibilities of action (in music listening), that are correlated to new 
forms of structural organization in music.xix By outlining the importance of habit 
formation, surprise and hypothesis generation (abduction), the Peircean perspective 
emphasizes the possibility of, and stresses the need for, empirical investigations of 
adaptive and creative listening. 
Imagine how listening to Stravinsky’s Le Sacre du Printemps may change the musical 
experience of a listener. For a listener familiar with tonal musical (especially the 
concert repertoire from 18th and 19th century) the first audition of Stravinsky’s Le 
Sacre would be daring enough. How could a reiterated chord as the one in the 
Adolescent’s Dance makes sense without any sort of harmonic movement, assuming 
that traditionally harmony only makes sense as movement?xx But in this case not only 
the lacking of harmonic movement is preeminent, but also the chordal non-standard 
constitution of two simultaneous chords (the triad of Fb Major and Eb seventh chord). 
Figure 5 illustrates such a passage. We believe that the audience of this Stravinky’s 
piece will create or reformulate their habits of listening, trying to make sense of Le 
Sacre as music, i.e., as a constellation of sound stimuli that matches the experience 
they have with artifacts they recognize as music—alternatively one could deny that 
this work has musical attributes and should not be called music at all. But suppose 
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once a (active) listener has altered his conceptual space after hearing Le Sacre, how 
would it change his later music experiences? 
 
 
Figure 5. Stravinsky’s Dance of Adolescents from the ballet Le Sacre du Printemps. 
Once a new habit is present in his conceptual space it will be available together with 
his old ones in listening to music meaningfully and affectively, i.e., generating and 
verifying expectations over music structures, understanding relations between 
antecedents and consequents etc. The habitual repertoire of musical habits is enlarged, 
enriched. Imagine the same listener now (re)listening Beethoven’s 3rd Symphony 
passage quoted in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6. Beethoven’s 3rd Symphony, first movement. 
Could it be that the steady harmony and non-usual chords from Stravinsky’s music 
interfere with Beethoven’s chords?  If yes, one can say that after hearing Stravinsky, 
Beethoven will never be (or sound) the same. For the listener is not the same 
anymore: his conceptual space has been altered and consequently his actions will 
reflect his newly acquired beliefs and habits. This example is an illustration of one 
situation that demands for abductive reasoning in turning an unusual (surprising) 
piece into a meaningful one and in outlining the consequences of the generated 
explanatory hypotheses for the conceptual space that may result in new experiences 
while listening anew to already familiar works. 
One could claim that merely by exposure the unfamiliar listener could derive new 
schemas, turning such extraneous music into a matter of fact. Thus induction and 
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deduction would be enough for a meaningful musical experience— but recall that 
Huron already suggested that inductive failure could play an important role in the 
generation of new musical schemas. In order to see why mere repetition of exposure 
does not suffice, we suggest to imagine a more radical example: electroacoustic 
music. We assume the hypothesis that electroacoustic music listening, although 
operating on the very same inferences as any kind musical listening (or any sort of 
semiotic process), presents an special interesting case for investigating adaptive 
listening due to the absence of a priori syntax and a broader range of possibilities than 
traditional musical systems. However interesting for our purpose, considerations of 
that repertoire require further developments that go beyond the scope of this paper 
and will be developed in another one. 
Our perspective on musical meaning might perhaps best be seen as a perspective on 
music signification, considering that the term ‘signification’ came from the Latin verb 
significare, which means ‘to indicate,’ i.e., it is an action; what we mean is that it is 
more a process of signification than an object conveyed somehow by music. Although 
it is not only a process but a special case of processes: an emergent process. In what 
follows, we will elucidate why the pragmatic perspective on musical signification 
implies emergentist considerations.xxi 
The first consideration one have to assume in any emergentist theory is that reality 
can be described as a system composed of several different levels, each of which with 
its own elements and organizations and with its own emergent properties. An 
emergent property is instantiated by the structures and organizations of elements of a 
lower level; those elements exert the causation required for the existence of the 
emergent property. There is a strong correlation between the basal conditions and the 
emergents; if the basal conditions change significantly their structures and/or 
organizations the past stable emergents cease to exist. Clarke (2005) presents an 
emergentist account of musical meaning considering the following levels: physical → 
chemical/biological → mental → social/cultural. Clarke’s theory encompasses several 
levels, and in order to understand how a level is emergent, one must consider what 
kinds of features are involved in such an account. 
Stephan (1999) considers the three main features involved in emergentist system: 
irreducibility, novelty and unpredictability of emergents. It means that an emergent 
property must be genuinely new in the system’s history, and/or unpredictable from the 
system actual behavior, because it is not analyzable from the system’s structure (for 
reasons of systemic complexity or inadequate computational tools, for instance), 
and/or not reducible to explanations of lower levels of the system’s structure. Clearly, 
the three features are related to each other. For example, if a property is not 
analyzable in terms of its basal conditions, and thus, it is unpredictable, one can say 
that a genuine novelty can arise within the system’s history which cannot be 
explained in a reductive fashion.xxii 
The musical signification process occurs only in the coupling between two 
independent systems: the listener conceptual space and the musical structures of a 
work. The (semiotic) process involved in music could be considered an emergent 
process, as any semiotic process (Queiroz & El-Hani, 2006, 2004). It is emergent for 
the signifying properties of the music-listener system are not reducible to any of the 
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structures in isolation. In this sense, musical meaning cannot be something conveyed 
in the music nor could be only a mental state elaborated by a detached mind. 
Furthermore, in most cases the coupling between independent systems cannot be 
predictable beforehand; besides some rough statistical approximations, no one can say 
what listening habits a listener has, or what kind of structures a work might have, 
even when the listener is embedded in a very specific cultural environment and the 
work reflect well-known music styles—as we see our music listening habits are 
always shifting during every significantly new musical experience we have. In this 
sense, musical meaning exists only as emergent property: a property of a semiotic 
system, which pragmatically unifies the possibilities of action of a listener 
(considering musical active listening as an action, guided by habits and beliefs) in 
relation to musical structures. 
We claim that semiosis is at the basis of the emergent signification processes in 
music, in which the interplay between habits, surprise and abductive formation of new 
(esthetic) beliefs and listening habits will guide one's further musical experience and 
actions. Moreover, abduction works in conjunction with induction and deduction; the 
more familiar the repertoire, the less abduction it demands; the more surprising, 
unusual a piece of music is, the more abduction it require from the active listener. 
However abduction is always involved in meaningful listening to interesting music 
for the reason that such music is always at least a little bit surprising. As the 
conceptual space changes dynamically over time by the means of abductive 
reasoning, the musical structures coupled with such space will be perceived and 
appreciated differently. That is why music is never the same. Objectively, the music 
structure of a work is always the same and music analysis demonstrates that, but the 
coupling between them and the dynamical conceptual space of listeners will result in 
emergent properties that allow for endless variety.xxiii Ultimately, one can hear the 
same work for a whole life and always find novelties ‘there’. Music signification is 
necessarily a creative, emergent and pragmatically oriented (semiotic) process.  
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i There is a large amount of well-known work about music and the thinking of C.S. Peirce, especially his 
semiotics, applying complex interpretations of the Peircean triadic sign chains in order to analyze and 
describe music. However, the philosophy of Peirce encompasses much more than his semiotics, which is 
part of his logical system. Our perspective in this paper is not concerned with sign taxonomy nor semiotic 
descriptions, but rather with the logical characterization of meaningful listening based on the interaction of 
abduction, deduction and induction. 
ii In a sense, both Meyer and Hanslick seem to share lots of common thoughts about music listening and 
signification, but one should consider that beyond such a evident congruence there is a difference between 
considering music as a phenomenon the intelligibility of which is culturally dependent, as in Meyer’s 
account, or universally shared, as in Hanslick’s. 
iii It is important to remember that the dynamics of hypothetical and evident meanings are not only 
horizontal but vertical as well, or among architectonic levels, as Meyer (1956: 38) said. 
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iv By “timeless work” Meyer means that the operation of memory is not constrained by the temporal flux of 
perception. 
v Actually, both types of processes might be more closely related to each other than the postulation of a 
dichotomy implies. Later we will see that in accordance with C.S. Peirce’s philosophy even the most basal 
perceptual phenomena are matters of habits and beliefs. 
vi Leonard Meyer’s 1956 book is full of music examples that illustrate the Gestalt principles operating in 
music perception, and for further clarification of the formal Gestalt properties of music structures we 
encourage the reader to consult this book. 
vii There are many different theories of emotions, but there seems to be a convergence towards 
understanding emotion as related to a kind of motivator for the organism (for a panoramic view see Oatley, 
2001; Juslin & Västfäll, 2008, offer a comprehensive view on musically induced emotions). 
viii Valence is a very well-know concept in Psychology (e.g. Barret, 2006; Rogers et al., 1977; Plutchik, 
1980), and in many models of emotion valence is usually correlated with arousal, e.g., in the well-known 
Circumplex Model postulated by Russell (1980). 
ix  We do not advocate here that the four types of memory that Huron distinguishes in relation to musical 
expectations are the only kind of memories that operate in music related activities. We believe that, despite 
Huron’s biologically inspired discourse, his mnemonic account is too much computational and disregard 
the possibility of an embodied knowledge of music. Take the example of a musician playing Beethoven: a 
normal pianist surely cannot tell you every note he plays in a Sonata, but he plays it without score—the 
coding in his memories is more motor-related, i.e. neuro-muscular, than content-related. This kind of 
memory is not accounted for in Huron’s theory. Also, there is evidence that in a listener motor-related brain 
areas are activated during the perception of musical structures and meaning (Haueisen & Knösche, 2001). 
x One of the most important editions of Peirce’s writings is the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders 
Peirce, in 8 volumes, edited by the Harvard University Press. Here we will refer to this edition using the 
usual system of reference: CP followed by volume and paragraph number. 
xi Peirce explicates this point as follows (CP.5.397-8): “And what, then, is belief? It is the demi-cadence 
which closes a musical phrase in the symphony of our intellectual life. We have seen that it has just three 
properties: First, it is something that we are aware of; second, it appeases the irritation of doubt; and, third, 
it involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action, or, say for short, a habit. As it appeases the 
irritation of doubt, which is the motive for thinking, thought relaxes, and comes to rest for a moment when 
belief is reached. But, since belief is a rule for action, the application of which involves further doubt and 
further thought, at the same time that it is a stopping-place, it is also a new starting-place for thought. That 
is why I have permitted myself to call it thought at rest, although thought is essentially an action. The final 
upshot of thinking is the exercise of volition, and of this thought no longer forms a part; but belief is only a 
stadium of mental action, an effect upon our nature due to thought, which will influence future thinking. 
The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit; and different beliefs are distinguished by the different 
modes of action to which they give rise. If beliefs do not differ in this respect, if they appease the same 
doubt by producing the same rule of action, then no mere differences in the manner of consciousness of 
them can make them different beliefs, any more than playing a tune in different keys is playing different 
tunes.” 
xii Studies of emotions that are often connected with these two kinds of surprise are the subject matter of 
psychology, but the analysis of the general structure of surprise belongs to the area of pragmatic logics—as 
we have seen logics is the basis of the Peircean philosophical system. 
xiii In this context, musical surprises will be often active, for, supposedly, listeners might have expectations 
even before the first note is heard (exceptions might happen when one’s mind is quiet), recalling Aiken 
(1951) for whom aesthetical experience is always a matter of beliefs and dispositions. 
xiv Meyer claimed that meaning in music should be sought in the listener’s experience, what, in a sense, 
Hanslick had already claimed. The difference between them seems to be more a matter of philosophical and 
psychological foundations than of a totally different perspective of musical meaning; Meyer had more 
developed theories of mind in comparison with the epistemological (and metaphysical) commitments which 
Hanslick assumed in his discourse. 
xv Like the very one postulated in Meyer’s and Huron’s theories. 
xvi What we are stating here is that the very work alone, i.e., the music structures one listens to, is not 
enough for a meaningful interpretation. Meaning also requires an active posture of the listener—musical 
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listening is action, in a sense—especially in a heterogeneous and dynamical cultural environment. Such a 
perspective on musical listening lead us to consider musical meaning as a kind of (semiotic) emergent 
property, but we will come back to this later in this paper. 
xvii See Meyer (1956) to verify how normative and deviant elements play a role in musical experience. 
xviii Or new schemas in Huron’s terms. 
xix And/or new forms of correlations between norms and deviants in Meyer’s terms. 
xx Harmonic movement can be thought as the progression of fundamentals of chords, or the movements of 
the bass and the superior voices in the practice of the continuo. In the sense of our example, one could 
extrapolate to Monteverdi’s concitatto style when a chord was also reiterated, although Stravinsky’s case is 
more radical because of the absence of harmonic movement. 
xxi There is not room for a complete introduction to the area of emergentism here. We refer the reader to 
specific articles on this subject (e.g. Stephan, 1999; Emmeche & El-hani, 1999; Oliveira et al., 2003; Meric 
& Solomos, 2008, Solomos & Di Scipio, 2008). 
xxii A very important notion associated with emergentist theories is downward causation, when emergent 
properties constrains or direct the behavior of the basal elements which instantiated them, but a detailed 
explanation of such notion is beyond the scope of this paper (for further clarification see, e.g., Stephan, 
2002; Kim, 1992). 
xxiii When out of this coupling new properties emerge, one can say that it will drive or constrain the 
possibilities for  perceiving the upcoming musical events (that will be part of the very same ongoing 
coupling), and that this might be interpreted as a form of  downward causation. However, for such an 
argument more space would be needed. Hopefully, further research can be devoted specifically to this 
subject. 
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